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The Interwar Housing Cycle  
in the Light of 2001– 2012
A Comparative Historical 
Perspective
Alexander J. Field
The Wnancial crisis of  2008 to 2009 and the Great Recession it precipitated 
forced a rethinking among macroeconomists about the origin, prevention, 
and potential mitigation of  such events. One of  the conclusions emerg-
ing from a considered examination of  the run-up to and the fallout from 
the events is the limitation of  framing the policy issues solely in terms of 
whether Chairman Bernanke and the Federal Reserve System, as well as 
President Obama and the Congress, did the right thing when the crisis hit. 
Most observers believe that the response to the immediate crisis was correct 
in the sense that they believe that the appropriate remedy, once the seizing 
up of  credit markets began, was indeed large scale Wscal and monetary 
stimulus.
As the Fed reduced short- term rates close to the zero lower bound, it 
almost tripled the size of  its balance sheet, and this ongoing monetary 
accommodation was augmented by the Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief  
Program (TARP, October 2008) and, beginning in February of 2009, the 
Wscal stimulus associated with the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
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1. Most of the eVects of the ARRA on employment and output were experienced in 2010 
and 2011. See Congressional Budget OYce (2013, 3, table 1).
Act (ARRA).1 The Republican takeover of the House of Representatives 
in the November 2010 midterm elections ended prospects for additional 
Wscal stimulus, at least from the expenditure side, but the Fed’s expansionary 
monetary stance continued as it sustained its expanded balance sheet, pur-
chasing, through its programs of quantitative easing, longer term securities 
as some of the troubled assets acquired at the height of the crisis matured.
Analysis of the appropriate response to the crisis drew inspiration from 
the experience of  the country during the Great Depression. Two of  the 
key policymakers, Christina Romer and Ben Bernanke, were both serious 
students of the Great Depression. Bernanke is famous for saying, at a 2002 
conference honoring Milton Friedman on his 90th birthday, “Regarding 
the Great Depression, you’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry . . . we won’t 
do it again” (Bernanke 2002). Or to put it slightly more accurately, we won’t 
not do it again, since Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963) brief  against the Fed 
was not their action, but their inaction in the face of bank failures and the 
consequent shrinkage in the country’s money supply.
But this approach to thinking about the lessons of either the Great Reces-
sion or the Great Depression, by focusing only on the policy response once 
the crisis emerged full blown, may dissuade us from examining the process 
whereby balance sheets become increasingly levered and increasingly risky 
over time—in other words, the process, which may extend over several years 
or even decades, whereby an economy can become increasingly Wnancially 
fragile (Minsky 1964, 1975, 1986). Ignoring this aspect of  the run-up to 
the most recent episode makes it diYcult to understand why or how the 
collapse of an asset price bubble in housing, and the consequent reduction 
of spending in an overbuilt sector could have threatened such catastrophic 
consequences for the United States and the world economy. To be sure, resi-
dential construction is an important component of gross private domestic 
investment, but it still contributes a small portion of overall planned spend-
ing. Even allowing for a generous multiplier, it is hard to see on the face of 
it how this relatively small tail could have had the potential to bring down a 
much larger economic dog.
The answer, which I think is appreciated more now than before 2008, 
is the signiWcance of  balance sheets, and in particular the ways in which 
high leverage in both the Wnancial and household sectors can generate tight 
interconnections and the potential for domino eVects (systemic impacts) as 
well as, in the context of house price declines, signiWcant wealth and liquid-
ity eVects. To focus only on Fed action or inaction once the crisis hit draws 
attention away from the multiple acts of legislative and regulatory commis-
sion and omission that allowed Wnancial fragility to grow in the Wrst place. 
It is much clearer now that balance sheets, debt, and leverage can make a big 
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2. After the start of the recession the Congressional Budget OYce revised downward its pro-
jections of potential GDP, in part because of anticipations of the deleterious eVects on labor 
productivity growth of long- term unemployment. This will reduce a calculation of cumulative 
output loss if  we deWne the recession and slow recovery as ending at the point where actual 
output again reaches potential. Such an estimate of cumulative output loss will be too small, 
since the permanently reduced trajectory of potential is also a consequence of the recession 
and slow recovery and the Wnancial fragility and crisis that precipitated it. See Field (2013) for 
calculations.
diVerence in how an economy responds to an asset price, and/or spending 
shock. The Wnancial fragility of an economy can spell the diVerence between 
whether the system shrugs oV a shock or potentially goes into a tailspin.
If  the history of the Great Depression enriched our understanding of 
and inXuenced the policy response to the Great Recession, reverse intellec-
tual inXuences are also probable—and desirable. In particular, postmortems 
on policy issues associated with the Great Recession should cause us to 
reconsider the shared beliefs among many (aside from real business cycle 
proponents) that the Great Depression was indeed principally caused by 
the absence of  adequate Federal Reserve response. The thesis that mas-
sive monetary accommodation in the early 1930s could almost entirely have 
eliminated the output cost of the Great Depression needs to be reexamined. 
Balance sheet considerations were likely implicated in the slow recovery 
then as well as now, and might have resulted in persistent output losses, 
even in the presence of a diVerent monetary policy. In the Great Recession, 
the Fed drove short rates close to the zero lower bound, and also engaged, 
in sustaining a balance sheet that increased almost by a factor of three, in 
buying large amounts of longer term Treasury securities. It is not clear how 
much more monetary accommodation could have been applied. And yet, in 
its April 27, 2011, release, the Fed forecast unemployment in 2013, a full Wve 
years after the worst months of the crisis, to still be in the 6.8 to 7.2 percent 
range (central tendency), with some within the Fed projecting an unemploy-
ment rate of 8.4 percent (Federal Reserve Board 2011a).
The Fed’s forecast was overly optimistic. The actual unemployment rate in 
June 2013 was 7.6 percent, and more than half  the unemployed had been out 
of work for Wfteen weeks or longer. It will likely be years before the economy 
reaches a prerecession forecast of the trajectory of potential output (this is 
written in 2013) and the cumulative output loss associated with the Great 
Recession may ultimately exceed one and a half  years of  gross domestic 
product (GDP) at 2007 rates.2
If  massive monetary accommodation will not be able to avoid a very large 
output loss over the years 2008 to 2017 and beyond we must reconsider 
whether, in fact, as conventional wisdom seems to hold, massive monetary 
accommodation in 1929 to 1933 would have avoided most of the output 
loss associated with those worst years of the Depression. The more recent 
monetary accommodation made a diVerence and without it the cumulative 
output loss would likely have been larger. Similarly, more Fed accommoda-
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3. Reinhardt and RogoV (2010) have been criticized for aspects of that paper suggesting that 
ratios of government debt to GDP above 90 percent represented a break point associated with 
much lower growth rates. In This Time Is DiVerent (2009), they had cast a considerably broader 
net, with as much emphasis on private as on public debt. One of the central messages of This 
Time Is DiVerent was that recoveries from recessions associated with Wnancial crises tended 
to be slower; neither the 2010 paper nor criticism of it undermined or conWrmed that gener-
alization. Based on US data, Bordo and Haubrich (2011) did express doubt, although much 
depended on the criteria used to deWne a Wnancial crisis. And they granted three important 
exceptions consistent with the Reinhardt and RogoV claim: the Great Depression, the recession 
of the early 1990s, and the recovery after the Great Recession.
4. Chapter 3 of the IMF’s 2012 World Economic Outlook oVers an overview of international 
and to some extent historical evidence that housing slumps associated with prior run-ups in 
household debt tend to be more severe and require more time for recovery. Koo (2009) empha-
sizes how high degrees of leverage contributed to years of slow economic growth in Japan, 
although the emphasis in the Japanese case is on corporate and bank as opposed to household 
balance sheets.
tion in the early 1930s would probably have meant a less severe Depression. 
The question on the table, however, is whether that was all that would have 
been needed to avoid a signiWcant cumulative output loss.
Carmen Reinhardt and Kenneth RogoV (2009) provide historical evidence 
that recessions associated with Wnancial crises require signiWcantly longer for 
recovery than those that do not.3 And Wnancial crises involving institutions 
that are not just illiquid but eVectively insolvent (because of a prior history 
of poor and/or risky lending, augmented in some cases by fraud) pose a 
much more serious policy challenge. Richard Koo’s (2009) analysis of Japan 
and the International Monetary Fund’s 2012 survey emphasize that highly 
leveraged balance sheets in the Wnancial, nonWnancial, and/or household 
sectors can make a big diVerence both in the resilience of an economy when 
faced with an asset price or spending shock, and on the eVectiveness of 
monetary policy in avoiding a large output loss.4
But if  balance sheet issues hindered recovery in the 1930s, we also need 
to ask whether housing was implicated in the same ways and to the same 
degree as has been true in the Great Recession. In 2007– 2012, bad real estate 
lending clearly impaired Wnancial sector balance sheets more than did poorly 
performing stock market– related loans. Was this true as well in the 1920s? In 
other words, compared to more recent experience, and other categories of 
lending, how much did residential mortgage lending in the 1920s contribute 
to weakening bank balance sheets, making them vulnerable in the 1930s 
to runs, insolvency, and failure? Secondly, at the level of  household bal-
ance sheets, was bad residential mortgage debt linked in some direct way to 
the anomalous drop in consumer durables spending that marked the initial 
stages of the economic downturn in 1929 and 1930 (Temin 1976)? Or did 
this have more to do with the loss of stock market wealth (Mishkin 1978) or 
increased burden of consumer loans (Olney 1999), or an eVect running from 
increased postcrash stock market volatility (Romer 1990)?
In this chapter I tread a narrow line, arguing on the one hand that we 
cannot understand the onset, depth, and duration of the Great Depression 
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5. Another diVerence is that net inXows of foreign capital, an important factor in the early 
twenty- Wrst century, were entirely absent in the 1920s, when the United States, running current 
account surpluses, was a net capital exporter.
6. Romer (1990) suggests that less than 2 percent of American households held stock at the 
time of the crash, citing Galbraith (1955, 78). But the empirical basis for this assertion is prob-
lematic. Galbraith cited a 1934 Senate investigation, in which 29 exchanges reported 1,548,707 
customer accounts. Assuming no more than one account per household, and with approxi-
mately 30 million occupied housing units in the country in 1930, this is closer to 5 percent than 
2 percent. I am indebted to Gavin Wright for drawing my attention to the open question of 
how extensive stock ownership was at this time.
7. See, for example, Mishkin (1978), who emphasized wealth and liquidity eVects; Romer 
(1990), who argued that post- 1929 stock market volatility adversely aVected consumer durables 
purchases; or Eichengreen and Mitchener (2004, 190), who reference stock market eVects on 
balance sheets throughout the economy.
8. The S&P 500 index temporarily exceeded its 2000 peak in 2007, although it remained, in 
inXation adjusted terms, about 18 percent below it. In November of 2011 it was, in real terms, 
without giving as much attention to balance sheet issues as we are now devot-
ing in the analysis of more recent events. At the same time I will maintain 
that the residential housing cycle, and lending associated with it, played a 
smaller role in the interwar business cycle compared to what has been true 
in the Wrst cycle of the twenty- Wrst century. To argue that housing was at the 
epicenter of the downturn in 1929 to 1931, as it was in 2007 to 2009, and 
as Gjerstad and Smith (see chapter 3, this volume) maintain, would require 
signiWcant changes in what have become established narratives of the origin 
of the downturn in the interwar period. That does not mean the claim is 
wrong, but rather that it needs to be carefully considered.
There are many similarities between the Great Depression and Great 
Recession, not least of  which is that each was preceded by asset price 
bubbles (boom and bust) in both equities and real estate. But there were 
also important diVerences. The timelines are roughly inverted.5 In the 1920s 
a residential real estate boom peaked in 1926, although it was followed by a 
boom in apartment building and one in central business district construction 
that extended into the early 1930s. The stock market boom was particularly 
strong in 1928 and 1929, and the crash in equity values is often taken as 
symbolic of the start of the Great Depression. Although the causal link has 
been questioned—scholars have pointed to the fact that industrial produc-
tion began to decline in the summer of 1929, or claimed that stock owner-
ship was concentrated among a small portion of the population,6 or that 
the market recovered considerably in the Wrst four months of 1930, or that 
big declines in output and employment did not begin until months after the 
crash—the October 1929 drop and subsequent downward trajectory retain 
a central place in narratives of origin.7
In the Great Recession, the sequence was roughly reversed. The boom in 
equities, particularly tech- based securities, began to collapse in 2000. This 
was followed, however, by a major boom in the prices and construction of 
residential housing, which peaked in early 2006. A commercial construction 
boom followed, as had been the case in the 1920s.8
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still close to 40 percent below its year 2000 high point. The NASDAQ index, which peaked 
at 5,408 in March of 2000, remained in inXation- adjusted terms, almost 60 percent below its 
peak. By May of 2013 the S&P 500 had risen substantially, but still stood in real terms below 
its 2000 peak.
9. The asset- side wealth eVects of the dot .com and real estate busts were of similar magni-
tude; the decline in stock values actually somewhat larger. Between December 1999 and Sep-
tember 2002 approximately $10 trillion of stock market value disappeared (Gjerstad and Smith 
2009). By the end of 2011, the housing crash had erased about $7 trillion dollars of house value 
(the comparison between these losses does not factor in the mild inXation that characterized 
the early twenty- Wrst century). Although the asset- side loss from stock market decline was 
somewhat larger than that associated with the housing bust, the real economy damage from 
the latter was worse, suggesting that a focus on the liability side of balance sheets is the key to 
understanding why this was so.
10. White (1990) argues that credit was not “pushed” on borrowers, but rather “pulled” by 
speculative fever in the stock market. His evidence is that when, under pressure from the Fed, 
But whereas the real economy appears to have largely shrugged oV the 
end of the residential real estate bubble in 1926, that does not appear to have 
been the case with the stock market crash of 1929 and the slow, sickening 
slide to a trough in 1932, marked as it was by some of the largest one- day 
percentage increases in stock prices. And whereas the real economy largely 
shrugged oV the collapse of the tech stock bubble in 2000 and 2001, that 
does not appear to have been the case with the real estate collapse that began 
in early 2006 and continued through the Wrst quarter of 2012. This asym-
metrical real economy response to asset price deXation is associated with 
almost diametrically opposed opportunities for leveraged asset acquisition 
in housing and equities during the run-ups to the two crises.9
During the 1920s, mortgages commonly required 50 percent down pay-
ments, were generally nonamortized, and were for relatively short periods 
(Wve years or less). In the case of federally chartered commercial banks, these 
limits were legally mandated. Other lenders exercised restraint for some of 
the same reasons national banks had been restricted in their ability to lend 
on housing: real estate had an historical record as a very risky asset. As the 
result of innovations in the 1920s by building and loans, then responsible for 
more than half  of institutional lending on residential housing, it did become 
possible in some instances for borrowers to obtain a second mortgage and 
thereby, through this mechanism, increase leverage (Snowden 2010). But not 
all building and loans were enthusiastic about the practice—the larger ones 
opposed it—and the overall norm remained short mortgages with modest 
loan- to-value ratios.
In stocks, however, the situation was almost exactly the reverse. Particu-
larly in the early and middle twenties, one could buy stocks for as little as 10 
percent down, with the remainder borrowed. The stock purchaser typically 
received margin from his broker, who in turn Wnanced this by securing a 
brokers’ loan from a bank or, in the late 1920s, directly from a corporation 
or private individual. If  the stock price declined such that borrower’s equity 
fell below an agreed upon minimum (which might be above 0), the borrower 
added margin or the lender sold out the position.10
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member banks in 1928 and 1929 cut back on brokers’ loans, this lacuna was, in the presence of 
very strong demand, quickly Wlled by private investors, corporations, and foreign banks. Rates 
on brokers’ loans rose during 1928 and 1929, along with the general level of interest rates, as 
the Fed allowed increases in the face of a rise in the transactions demand for cash associated 
with the upsurge in stock trading (Field 1984). The Fed rationalized these rate increases, along 
with member bank restrictions on brokers’ loans, as part of a program that would help control 
speculation in the stock market. Rappoport and White (1994) summarize evidence that margins 
rose from 10 to 25 percent in the early to mid- 1920s to 40 to 50 percent in 1928 and especially 
1929. A brokers’ loan was in principle collateralized, but creditors still bore risk because of the 
possibility, if  prices went into free fall, that a lender might not be able to sell quickly enough 
to secure his initial investment. Higher margins provided additional protection against this 
risk. Rappoport and White also show that the premium on brokers’ time loans rose relative to 
Treasury rates, also consistent with the likelihood that lenders had increasing concerns about 
a possible crash. Nevertheless, through whatever channels, and at whatever price, credit sup-
ported the run-up in stock purchases and prices, as evidenced by the close correlation between 
outstanding brokers’ loans and security prices (White 1990, Wgure 4, 75).
11. Mishkin (1978) argued that the stock market decline between 1929 and 1932 aVected 
household demand through both wealth and liquidity eVects. Romer (1990) questioned the 
empirical signiWcance of  the wealth eVect. Typical econometric estimates are that a dollar 
decline in household wealth will reduce consumption by four or Wve cents. The liquidity mecha-
nism predicts that if  Wnancial liabilities rise, or if  the illiquid portion of assets rises, then demand 
for new durables and house ownership may decline. The composition of the household balance 
sheet, therefore, has the potential to inXuence the amount and composition of consumption. 
Leveraged acquisition by households of stocks, as opposed to real estate or consumer durables, 
was less likely to generate liquidity eVects because of the nature of margin loan contracts. If  
prices fell, the borrower could add margin to retain the position, but in cases of rapid price 
decline, the more likely outcome was that the lender simply sold out the position, removing the 
stock from the asset side of the balance sheet but at the same time extinguishing the associated 
liability. Banks in the aggregate did have considerable exposure. On December 31, 1929, loans 
on securities comprised 39 percent of all member bank loans, more than triple the amount 
of  real estate loans, and loans on securities remained substantially above real estate loans 
throughout the worst years of the Depression (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
Board 1943, Banking and Monetary Statistics, table 19, 76). But loans on securities were heavily 
concentrated in the large money center banks, which in general did not fail, suggesting that for 
the thousands of banks that did, bad real estate loans may have played a more important role 
than is suggested by the aggregate data.
In 1934, following the worst years of the Great Depression, the Securities 
and Exchange Act gave the Federal Reserve authority to set margin require-
ments on stocks. Since 1975 these have been Wxed, for new purchases by 
individuals, at 50 percent. When the tech bubble collapsed, many investors 
did see their balance sheets shrink. Nevertheless, because the acquisition of 
stocks had, to a lesser degree than in the 1920s, been Wnanced with borrowed 
money, the collapse of the price bubble had lower potential to transmit dis-
tress to other entities (Wnancial institutions) that, indirectly or directly, held 
equities on the left- hand (asset) side of their balance sheets.11 The end of the 
tech boom also meant some retardation in the acquisition of information 
technology (IT) equipment which, through multiplier eVects, inXuenced 
consumption spending and the retardation of GDP growth. From a com-
parative perspective, however, the 2001 recession saw few Wnancial failures 
and was of mild severity and duration. Only in the quarterly data (2001:1) 
do we see a slight (one quarter) decline in real GDP (see US Department of 
Commerce 2013, NIPA table 1.1.6).
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12. By a bubble I mean an increase in asset prices unrelated to improvements in fundamentals. 
It is always easier to see and say this after the fact, but even before the crash it was apparent 
to a critical observer that the unprecedented increase in the ratio of house prices to median 
household income in the early twenty- Wrst century could not continue indeWnitely.
13. The failure in November 2011 of Jon Corzine’s Wrm, MF- Global, was a reminder that a 
newer and more eVective regulatory regime, one less subject to exploitation of loopholes and 
political manipulation, remained a work in progress. Corzine had placed highly leveraged bets 
(using leverage ratios of more than 30 to 1—higher than investment banks, somewhat chas-
tened, were then risking) that troubled European sovereign debt would recover. Because of the 
very slim equity cushion, it did not take much of a continued slide in the prices of these bonds to 
push the Wrm into bankruptcy. Corzine also took advantage of weakening restrictions on what 
trading Wrms could do with supposedly segregated customers’ accounts (see Burrough, Cohan, 
and McLean 2012), and had personally intervened to help Wght back eVorts by the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission to tighten these. See http://blogs.wsj .com/deals/2011/10/31 
/mf- global- bankruptcy- the- biggest- losers/.
14. The implications of the failure of construction spending to revive are signiWcant. Through-
out the 1920s, gross investment in equipment, residential structures, and nonresidential struc-
tures were each of similar magnitude. In 1937, both construction categories remained substan-
tially short of equipment investment. I calculate that had these three categories retained their 
rough equality with the rates exhibited by equipment investment, and assuming a  multiplier of 
1.78, GDP in 1937 would have been $102.2 billion rather than the actual $91.9 billion. I esti-
mate potential output in that year at $110.9 billion (all magnitudes in 1937 dollars). According 
In contrast, the collapse of the real estate bubble12 starting in 2006 set in 
motion rows of falling dominoes that threatened to bring the United States 
and the world economy to its knees.
These observations suggest that the pre- 2008 complacency among econo-
mists and policymakers about how real estate acquisition was Wnanced was 
not justiWed. We should have been more concerned. Leverage mattered. This 
is a matter of continuing and more general concern. In spite of the passage 
of the Dodd- Frank bill in July of 2010, there has to date (May 2013) been 
little movement to alter the incentives that even bigger and more intercon-
nected Wnancial institutions have to make risky bets with borrowed money.13
As we try to parse the lessons from the most recent cycle, there is much to 
be learned by going back and reexamining the history of housing during the 
interwar period. In particular, it would be helpful to understand better why 
the end of the residential real estate boom in 1926 appears to have had such 
a limited adverse eVect on the real economy, as compared to what happened 
in the early twenty- Wrst century (on this question, see White, chapter 4, this 
volume). At the same time, we need to understand why private sector con-
struction remained so depressed for such a long time during the 1930s. More 
than two decades ago I argued that this was principally due to the physical 
and legal detritus of premature subdivision in the 1920s (Field 1992), and 
that in the postwar period, housing booms have created fewer obstacles to 
recovery from this source, due to the development of zoning and land use 
regulation. That is likely to be true as well for the most recent boom, since 
land use regulation, unlike that applicable to Wnancial institutions, was less 
aVected by the deregulatory enthusiasms of the 1980s and 1990s (see also 
Field [2011], chapters 10 and 11).14 More than six years after it peaked in 
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to these calculations, more than half  the output gap remaining in 1937 can be accounted for 
by the failure of construction to revive. The contribution of the residential housing shortfall 
considered alone is about a third. For details, see Field (2011, 271).
15. US Department of Commerce 2013, NIPA table 1.1.5, accessed May 30, 2013.
16. For a contrasting view see Gjerstad and Smith, chapter 3, this volume.
17. Home owners in the most recent episode faced increasing real debt burdens, but this was 
more typically due to their use of innovative Wnancial products such as negative amortization 
loans with low teaser rates that subsequently reset.
2006:1, expenditures on residential construction began to recover in 2012, 
although in 2013:1, a full seven years after the peak, these expenditures 
proceeded at less than half  peak levels in nominal and real terms.15
On the other hand, leverage, debt overhang, and foreclosure played a 
major role in amplifying the impact of the housing bust in 2006 to 2012, 
posing obstacles to full economic recovery (Financial Crisis Inquiry Com-
mission 2011). An open question historically is how much the debt overhang 
of the residential housing boom of the 1920s, as compared to the direct 
legacy of premature subdivision, contributed to slow recovery during the 
1930s. Looking at the two booms using a comparative approach can give us 
some perspective on this.
What happened in the early twenty- Wrst century was quite diVerent in a 
number of respects from what happened in the interwar period. The epicen-
ter of the problems causing the initial downturn in 2007 was clearly housing, 
which most argue was not the case in the Depression.16 And whereas Irving 
Fisher’s debt deXation mechanism aVected mortgaged housing between 
1929 and 1933, the problems in the sector in the recent episode were caused 
only marginally by increasing debt burdens due to deXation. Although Ber-
nanke and other policymakers feared more severe deXation, in part as a 
result of  their actions, the annual rate of  change of  the consumer price 
index (CPI) for all urban consumers was negative only in 2009, declining 
at .37 percent per year, as compared with 3.8 percent growth in 2008, and 
returned to positive territory (1.6 percent per year) in 2010 (US Department 
of Labor 2011). This is to be compared with the 8 percent per year deXation 
that characterized 1929 to 1933.17
Bad mortgage debt contributed directly to failures of building and loans, 
the provider of the majority of institutionally Wnanced mortgages during the 
1920s, and this bears some relationship to the ways in which housing travails 
ended up threatening system- wide damage to the economy by jeopardizing 
the solvency of Wnancial institutions in the 2007 to 2011 period. But the 
argument (Gjerstad and Smith, chapter 3, this volume) that balance sheet 
issues associated with housing were central both to the initial downturn in 
the Great Depression and to the slow recovery must overcome the long lag 
of several years between when the residential housing boom ended (1926) 
and the beginning of the downturn in the real economy in 1929. It must also 
overcome the relatively small share of institutional lending on residential 
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18. Temin (1976, 92) also attributed the failure of the Bank of United States to bad loans, 
particularly real estate loans.
housing contributed by commercial banks: a Wfth or less prior to 1937 (Mor-
ton 1956, table C- 2, 170).
We have abundant historical evidence that commercial bank failures can 
pose a systemic threat to an economy. It is less clear that this would have been 
so with building and loans. Such institutions did not issue demand deposits, 
and so their failure could not reduce the money supply. Moreover, unlike 
commercial banks, they did not typically borrow from or lend to other Wnan-
cial institutions, and thus contributed little to the interconnections among 
Wnancial sector balance sheets that can facilitate contagion.
On the other hand, there is little doubt that bad real estate lending contrib-
uted to the vulnerability and failure of speciWc commercial banks, particu-
larly state- chartered banks, which faced fewer constraints on their lending 
in this area than did their nationally chartered counterparts. Natacha Postel- 
Vinay (2011) has found, based on longitudinal analysis of balance sheet data 
for Chicago- area state banks, that real estate lending in the 1920s inXuenced 
which banks were vulnerable to failure in the early 1930s. In particular, as 
did Elmus Wicker (1980), she disputes the view that bank runs were simply 
liquidity events inspired by irrational fear, crises that could have been averted 
by temporary intervention from the Fed. She suggests instead that most 
failed banks were insolvent, and that they were so in particular because of 
bad real estate lending. In other words she tells a story—admittedly one 
based on the Chicago data alone—that bears analogues to 2001 to 2010, and 
is in this sense supportive of what Gjerstad and Smith are trying to advance.
Indeed, it does sometimes appear that wherever and whenever one digs 
into the failure of a commercial bank during the Depression, the words “bad 
real estate lending” are likely to follow. This is true for the famous case of 
the Bank of United States (see Lucia 1985; O’Brien 1992; Trescott 1992), 
although stock market loans, in particular loans to aYliates and others to 
support holding the bank’s own stock, were also implicated in its failure.18 
Bad real estate loans were also prominent in the collapse of the Bain group 
of banks in Chicago in June 1931, which spread to the Forman banks (Gugli-
elmo 2011, 35). A third case in point is the failure of the Tennessee- based 
banking empire of Caldwell and Company, which Wgures prominently in 
the Gjerstad and Smith narrative. Wicker (1980) attributed the failure of 
Caldwell and 120 other banks to poor loans and investments made in the 
1920s (1980, 572).
Still, categories such as “real estate lending,” or “urban mortgages” 
include loans not only on residential housing, but also on commercial and 
industrial property; the focus here is mainly on the comparative contribution 
of the residential housing cycle to recession/depression. Caldwell’s prob-
lems, for example, appear to have been largely in commercial real estate and 
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municipal investment complementary to it rather than strictly residential 
lending (Tennessee Encyclopedia 2011).
Wicker saw his interpretation as supporting Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963) in what was then an ongoing debate with Temin (1976). But  Wicker’s 
analysis is really quite inconsistent with the narrative Friedman and 
Schwartz advanced. Friedman and Schwartz downplayed the extent to 
which failing banks were insolvent as a result of a prior history of risky or 
poorly selected loans and investments, emphasizing instead that the bank-
ing panics were almost entirely liquidity events. This is particularly evident 
in their characterization of the failure of the Bank of United States, which 
they considered a solvent bank, attributing the fact that it was not rescued 
in part to anti- Semitism. Friedman and Schwartz mention, although they 
do not pursue further, the possibility that “the great surge in bank failures 
that characterized the Wrst banking crisis after October 1930 may . . . have 
resulted from poor loans and investments made in the twenties” (Temin 
1976, 85; Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 355).
As does Wicker, Guglielmo (2011) links vunerability in the 1930s to poor 
lending in the 1920s, attributing a weakening of Illinois state bank portfolios 
to the drying up of opportunities to make short- term commercial loans—as 
many corporations shifted from debt to equity Wnancing. To make up for 
lost business, he suggests, banks shifted into loans backed by real estate or 
stock. Although such loans may have been viewed as safe at the time they 
were made, they turned out, ex post, to be quite risky. Unlike commercial 
loans, neither category was discountable at the Fed. In the case of real estate, 
the relatively low loan- to-value ratios of 1920s loans did not end up protect-
ing bank collateral as eVectively as may have appeared to have been the case 
when they were originated, largely due to the perhaps unexpectedly high 
cost of foreclosure. Similarly, loans on stock (e.g., brokers’ loans), although 
championed in the 1920s as almost as liquid as cash, turned out not always 
to be so when the free fall of equity prices made it impossible to sell out fast 
enough to recover collateral.
Therefore, there is considerable evidence linking bad lending in the 1920s, 
including bad real estate lending, to Wnancial institution vulnerability in 
the 1930s, suggesting that failures, which were already high in the 1920s 
and rose much further in the 1930s, were not pure liquidity events but often 
involved institutions driven to insolvency by a prior history of risky lending 
(Calomiris and Mason 1997, 2003). This suggests strong parallels with the 
early twenty- Wrst century, and would again seem to provide support for the 
Gjerstad and Smith position. While acknowledging the importance of this 
dynamic in understanding the interwar cycle, I will nevertheless continue 
to make the case that the residential housing cycle in the 1920s was not the 
epicenter of the Great Depression in the way it so clearly has been for the 
Great Recession. To the degree that real estate lending was implicated in 
bank failures in the 1920s, and it was considerable, the loans tended to be 
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farm mortgages, rather than loans on residential real estate per se (Alston, 
Grove, and Wheelock 1994).
It is indeed tempting to conclude that the 1920s were like the early twenty- 
Wrst century, and that the foundations for the Depression were established 
in housing in the 1920s. To some degree this was no doubt true. As I have 
previously argued, premature subdivision in the 1920s posed legal and infra-
structural impediments to the revival of  house construction in the 1930s 
(Field 1992). But the Wnancial groundwork diVered in important ways. In 
the earlier period a smaller fraction of houses was mortgaged, and loan- 
to-value ratios were lower—in other words the sector was much less levered. 
Bad real estate loans adversely aVected building and loan societies (fore-
runners of savings and loans), but their failures had little systemic impact. 
In spite of the role that poor real estate (and in general poor and in some 
cases fraudulent) lending played in notable bank failures in the 1930s, the 
fact remains that commercial bank holdings of institutional mortgages on 
one- to-four family houses never rose above 20 percent of the total until 1937 
(Morton 1956, table C-2).
Because of a history of wild real estate booms and busts prior to the Civil 
War, the National Banking Act (1864) tightly restricted the loans national 
banks could make on land or housing. Although these prohibitions were 
weakened in the face of competition from state chartered institutions, total 
lending on mortgages by federally chartered commercial banks remained 
very low until the second decade of the twentieth century. On June 4, 1913, 
real estate loans accounted for just .7 percent of national bank assets (Beh-
rens 1952, 16).
Loosening began with the Federal Reserve Act (1913), which for the Wrst 
time allowed loans on farmland with loan- to-value not to exceed 50 per-
cent and a period of time not to exceed Wve years, provided such loans in 
the aggregate did not exceed 25 percent of bank capital and surplus or a 
third of time deposits. The 1916 legislation went somewhat further, freeing 
national banks to lend on nonfarm real estate for a period of time not to 
exceed one year, again with a maximum 50 percent loan-to-value. The one- 
year restriction was serious: prior to the McFadden Act, many commercial 
bank mortgage loans were eVectively demand loans after the Wrst year. The 
McFadden Act (1927) increased the allowable term on nonfarm mortgages 
to Wve years with the total amount of such loans not to exceed 50 percent of 
time deposits. In most cases commercial banks could not lend across state 
lines, and indeed were restricted to lending on real estate within 100 miles 
of the bank’s principal place of business.
State- chartered banks did not face the same restrictions in the 1920s, 
perhaps one reason their failure rates were so much higher in the 1930s. 
Still, even with more liberal real estate lending on the part of state banks, 
total commercial bank lending as a fraction of institutional lending on one- 
to-four family houses did not rise above 20 percent until 1937. The rise at 
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that point was partly the result of an amendment to the Federal Reserve 
Act in 1935 that allowed national banks to make ten- year loans, with up to 
60 percent loan- to-value, if  the loan was suYciently amortized to reduce 
principal by at least 40 percent within ten years. This was part of a coordi-
nated program of mortgage liberalization advanced during the New Deal, 
reXected in the establishment of the Federal Housing Authority in 1934 and 
the Federal National Mortgage Association in 1938. These legislative and 
policy initiatives led ultimately to the thirty- year, fully amortized Wxed rate 
instrument that became common after the Second World War.
Finally, although mortgage- backed securities appeared in the 1920s, 
their development was much less advanced than became the case in the 
early twenty- Wrst century (White 2009, Wgure 4.14). During the 1920s they 
were largely limited to pools of mortgages on apartments or other commer-
cial properties, as opposed to Wrst mortgages on owner- occupied houses. 
(Goetzmann and Newman 2010). Robert J. Gordon has noted that more 
skyscrapers higher than 250 feet tall were built in New York between 1922 
and 1931 than in any ten- year period before or since. Securitization and 
other innovations played a signiWcant role in Wnancing this capital forma-
tion, and the balance sheet consequences, in terms of the duration of the 
interwar cycle, remain to be investigated. But this dynamic is distinct from 
what we normally understand as the residential housing cycle, and is not the 
central focus of this chapter.
Turning now from Wnancial sector to household sector balance sheets, we 
can consider other channels through which asset price deXation might have 
contributed to the propagation of the Great Depression. In the presence 
of a central bank with an asymmetric commitment to price stability, and 
thus in the presence of deXation, even the moderate (relative to the early 
twenty- Wrst century) expansion of debt in housing that took place during 
the 1920s could have contributed, through the debt deXation mechanism, to 
declines in demand, particularly for durables and houses themselves. Freder-
ick Mishkin’s breakdown of the household balance sheet during the Depres-
sion shows mortgage liabilities increasing in real terms from $29.6 billion in 
1929 to $33.6 billion in 1930, to $36.9 billion in 1931, and to $40.5 billion 
in 1932. He shows security loans jumping in real terms from $16.4 billion in 
1929 to $21.6 billion in 1930, before falling oV to $17.4 billion in 1931 and 
$12.4 billion in 1932. Consumer credit liabilities (for automobiles, for ex-
ample) increased from $10.1 billion in 1929 to $12 billion in 1930, to $12.3 
billion in 1931, and then fell to $11.3 billion in 1932 (Mishkin 1978, 921; 
all Wgures in 1958 dollars). These numbers suggest that the biggest nega-
tive shock coming from the liabilities side of the household balance sheet 
between 1929 and 1930 was the increase in the real value of security loans: 
$5.2 billion. The increase in the real value of real estate liabilities, $4 billion, 
was about a fourth less. The stock of real estate debt, however, was larger 
than securities and consumer credit debt combined, and persisted at high, 
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19. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board 1943, Banking and Monetary Statistics 
(table 19, 76) shows end- of-year member bank loans on securities falling from $10.148 billion 
in 1929 to $9.439 billion in 1930, although the average level of brokers’ loans was higher in 
1930 than in 1929. Even a generous allowance for deXation cannot generate the increase in real 
value of loans on securities reported by Mishkin.
and in the case of real estate lending rising levels (in real terms) much longer, 
in part perhaps because of less adequate resolution mechanisms.
Mishkin’s data suggest that the liability- side wealth eVects on consump-
tion emanating from stock acquisition in the 1920s were stronger than those 
from real estate debt in producing the initial shocks that led to the downturn 
in the economy between 1929 and 1930. However, there are unresolved issues 
about the data underlying his analysis of equities. Mishkin’s table A- 1 gives 
as the source for the stock market loan data column (4) of table L- 25 in 
Goldsmith (1955, vol. 1, 410). That table shows that nominal commercial 
bank loans for purchasing or acquiring securities fell from $8.278 billion in 
1929 to $7.251 billion in 1930 (these are listed in the table as end- of-year 
values).19 That is what one would have expected to have happened if, in 
the presence of rapid price declines, lenders sold out the positions of their 
leveraged borrowers, thus extinguishing the loans. The only circumstance in 
which we might have expected nominal loans to have increased is if, in the 
face of collapsing stock values, many borrowers met their margin calls and 
even acquired new stock on margin in the expectation that price declines 
represented a buying opportunity. This is possible, especially given that most 
of the largest one- day price increases in the market during the twentieth 
century took place between 1929 and 1932. But it seems much less likely than 
the Wrst scenario, which would be consistent with the numbers in Goldsmith.
The problem with reconciling these numbers with Mishkin (1978) is 
that there is too little deXation between 1929 and 1930 to turn these nomi-
nal decreases into real increases, let alone real increases of the magnitude 
reported in his table 2. The stock market crash may have adversely aVected 
spending in such areas as consumer durables because of a reduction in stock 
market values or because of the inXuence of volatility on perceived uncer-
tainty, as emphasized by Romer. It appears questionable, however, at the 
household level, whether the balance sheet eVects of declining stock values 
on the asset side was reinforced by a rising real value of stock market loans 
on the liabilities side. Between 1929 and 1933 the wealth eVects of declines 
in the values of  equities were considerably more serious than were those 
associated with declines in the value of real estate. On the asset side of the 
household sector balance sheet, corporate stocks in 1929 were worth more 
than real estate ($128.8 billion vs. $109.7 billion), a situation dramatically 
reversed by 1933 ($50.9 billion vs. $81.7 billion) (data are nominal and are 
from Woolf and Marley 1989, table 15.A.1, 817). Stocks fell in value more 
than real estate, and much more than consumer prices, and so the asset- 
side wealth eVect was quite large. Woolf and Marley give a 1929 value of 
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total equities held of $235.4 billion. That included unincorporated business 
equity, trust fund equity, insurance and pension equity, as well as corporate 
stock ($128.8 billion). The Dow Jones index fell 89 percent in nominal terms 
and 60 percent in real terms between its peak in August of 1929 and trough 
in July of 1932, although it recovered somewhat in 1933. Using the data 
from Woolf and Marley, limiting ourselves to corporate stock and assum-
ing 30 percent goods and service price deXation between 1929 and 1933, we 
have stock values dropping 60 percent in nominal terms and 44 percent in 
real terms over this four- year period for a loss in wealth of $57 billion in 
1929 dollars. Using the Goldsmith numbers from table L- 25, we have stock 
market borrowing dropping from $8.278 billion to $3.078 billion (nominal). 
Again, assuming 30 percent deXation, we have stock market liabilities declin-
ing 63 percent nominal and 47 percent real, for a decline of $4.4 billion in 
1929 dollars. Combining the eVects of declines of both stock market assets 
and liabilities between 1929 and 1933, we have a negative net wealth eVect 
of $52.6 billion ($57 billion drop on the asset side, counterbalanced by a 
$4.4 billion decline on the liabilities side).
In real estate, the locus of the balance sheet eVects diVered, and overall 
impact on net worth was much smaller. If  we accept Shiller’s numbers (see 
following) the price of houses fell, but only along with the general deXation, 
so real values were largely unaVected, and therefore the asset- side wealth 
eVects in the aggregate were on average small. On the liabilities side, a much 
smaller fraction of the housing stock was mortgaged, and loan- to-value 
ratios were much lower than was true in the early twenty- Wrst century. Woolf 
and Marley (1989, table 15.A) show nominal housing values dropping from 
$109.7 billion to $81.7 billion between 1929 and 1933, a decline of 25 per-
cent. Shiller has nominal prices dropping 30 percent over those years. If  we 
make allowance for a modest increase in the number of structures over that 
four- year period, these estimates are roughly consistent with each other.
On the other hand, the interactions of  real estate debt and deXation 
clearly became important in 1931 and 1932, and the negative wealth eVect 
on the liability side was nonnegligible. Woolf  and Marley (1989) have nomi-
nal mortgage debt falling from $16.6 billion in 1929 to $13.3 billion in 1933. 
Again assuming an approximately 30 percent decline in goods and services 
prices over the four- year period, this means real mortgage debt rose from 
$16.9 billion in 1929 to $19 billion in 1933, a 14 percent increase, a total 
of  $2.1 billion in 1929 prices. Since we are assuming essentially no eVect in 
inXation- adjusted terms on the asset side of the balance sheet, this is the 
total deXationary impact from real estate. Even if  Woolf  and Marley are oV 
by a factor of  two or three, and the rise in real estate liabilities is closer to 
what Mishkin reports, it is clear that the stock market eVects on household 
balance sheets in the Wrst four years of  the Depression were much larger 
than those emanating from real estate—probably an order of  magnitude 
larger.
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To summarize, from the stock market, we have for the household sector 
very large negative wealth eVects from the assets side, only modestly coun-
teracted by the reduction in liabilities from the closing out of  margined 
positions. In the case of real estate, we have little if  any eVect on the asset 
side from change in real housing values, along with a negative wealth eVect 
of an increase in mortgage liabilities through the debt deXation mechanism. 
The relatively modest impact on household balance sheets from the real 
estate sector over the worst years of the Great Depression, in comparison 
with the impact of stock market decline, contrasts sharply with the respec-
tive impacts from these two asset classes during the 2006 to 2012 period. In 
the latter period, as I will show, not only were the housing price declines, 
both nominal and real, comparatively larger, but so too was the impact of 
the rising nominal and real value of mortgage liabilities.
Note that, with respect to real estate, debt deXation had conXicting eVects 
on lending institutions’ balance sheets. To the degree that households 
managed to remain current on their nominally Wxed mortgage payments, 
de Xation beneWted lenders, because the real value of debt repayment went 
up. Indeed, bond interest was the one category of income to capital that 
increased in real terms between 1929 and 1933 (Field 2011, 269). Similarly, 
declines in short rates should, ceteris paribus, have increased the value of 
the higher interest longer term mortgages. But to the degree that deXation 
drove borrowers to default, lenders were harmed. When real estate borrow-
ers defaulted, of course, this may have been attributable to loss of income as 
the consequence of unemployment, to rises in the real burden of payments 
due to the debt deXation mechanism, or because the loan was of poor quality 
in the Wrst place—and likely would not have continued to perform even in 
the absence of deXation or increases in the unemployment rate.
The most recent housing cycle has been marked by a sharp decline in 
both the nominal and real value of housing. In contrast, although housing 
prices dropped in the early 1930s, they did so only in line with the general 
deXation. Unlike the early twenty- Wrst century, however, goods and service 
price deXation raised the real burden of nominally Wxed mortgage payments, 
which did contribute to foreclosure.
The wave of foreclosures in the early twenty- Wrst century, on the other 
hand, required neither deXation nor falling income to precipitate it. Falling 
(indeed, no longer rising) nominal house prices combined with high loan-to-
value and “innovative” Wnancing instruments such as negative amortization 
loans with teaser initial rates were enough to get many home owners into 
very serious trouble. Because average loan- to-value ratios were so much 
lower as were nominal price declines, the phenomenon of underwater homes 
(loan balances greater than house values), still endemic today (2013), was 
less common during the Depression (but see also Guglielmo 2011, 13, who 
asserts the contrary, although without evidence). In the nation as a whole 
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20. http://www .zillow .com/visuals/negative- equity/#12/43.8065/- 71.5023, accessed May 30, 
2013.
more than one in four home owners with a mortgage remained underwater 
in the Wrst quarter of 2013.20
It was much more the case, particularly after 1929, that people got into 
trouble not because housing prices had fallen per se, but because income had 
fallen as the result of other causes, combined with the eVects of deXation 
in raising the burden of mortgage payments Wxed in nominal terms. In a 
number of respects, therefore, the precipitators of  foreclosure diVered in 
the two cycles.
2.1 Shiller’s Series
As part of the research for his book Irrational Exuberance (2006), Robert 
Shiller assembled a series on real and nominal house prices going back to 
1890. His source for nominal house prices for 1890 to 1933 is Grebler, Blank, 
and Winnick (1956), whose data were based on a survey of home owners in 
twenty- two cities who were asked to report the value of their house in 1934 
and what they originally paid for it and when. Since the index created from 
these reports tracks prices for the same housing units at diVerent times, it 
is not subject to the compositional bias that can bedevil comparisons of 
median house prices over time (see Shiller 2006, 234).
Shiller’s data for 1934 to 1941 are based on advertised home prices in 
newspapers in Wve cities: Chicago, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York, 
and Washington, DC. His students collected about thirty house prices for 
each city for each year, except that the Washington data are based on a 
median price series from Fisher (1951). Data for those years may therefore 
be partially aVected by the upward bias characteristic of median sales price 
data, which can in part reXect improvements in house quality. Given the 
relatively low level of house construction during the 1930s, however, the bias 
is probably small. Shiller uses the Consumer Price Index to deXate nominal 
house values both pre- and post- 1934 to get a series on real house prices, 
which appear in his book as part of Wgure 2.1.
For most readers of the second edition of Irrational Exuberance (the Wrst 
dealt only with the stock market boom), the principal takeaway from the 
longtime series on real housing prices was the strikingly dramatic run-up in 
real estate prices between 2000 and 2006. In percentage terms the increase 
in the real price of a house (approximately 60 percent between 2000:1 and 
2006:1) was larger during this period than during any comparable period 
going back to 1890. The increase in house prices following the Second World 
War (measuring from 1944 to 1953) came close in percentage terms, but it 
took place over a larger number of years and, in contrast with the run-up 
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over the 2000 to 2006 period, the new higher level of real house prices was 
sustained for half  a century.
As Shiller updated his numbers, they revealed a staggering fall in the value 
of an asset that conventional wisdom held should and could never decline 
nationally. According to his quarterly data, nominal prices through 2012:1 
declined 34 percent from their peak in 2006:2. The economy also experienced 
mild inXation over this period. Data on real housing values indicate that they 
declined 42 percent over the period 2006:1 through 2012:1; the index drops 
from 198.1 to 113.9. Widespread reports of price appreciation in 2013, par-
ticularly in certain markets, such as the San Francisco Bay Area, did reXect 
a real phenomenon, but the positive news was much ampliWed by the real 
estate industry. Shiller’s real price index for houses had risen to 121.7 by the 
fourth quarter of 2012, a 7 percent increase from the trough, but a long way 
from 198.1.
In a 2005 interview with New York Times correspondent David Leonhardt, 
Shiller predicted house prices could fall 40 percent in inXation- adjusted 
terms (Leonhardt 2005). Because of the mechanics of simple percent cal-
culations, the 60 percent increase followed by 42 percent decrease in real 
housing prices left the index in 2011:4 below where it had been in 1998:4, 
thirteen years earlier. By 2012:4 it had recovered to where it was in 1999. 
The price recovery to date (May 2013) has been, on a national level, quite 
modest. With one out of four home owners with a mortgage still underwater 
(see footnote 20) the magnitude and severity of this housing cycle should 
not be downplayed.
Investors are taught that they must be prepared to take substantial losses 
if  they are to enjoy the upside potential of assets such as stocks. But it is not 
what individuals expected from housing, certainly in the postwar period. 
The expectation that houses would hold and possibly increase their value 
helped justify and reinforce institutional changes that allowed lower down 
payments (higher leverage) in house purchases starting in the 1930s. New 
norms and mechanisms of housing Wnance originating in the 1930s estab-
lished an institutional regime that helped real house prices remain basically 
stable for Wfty years, from the early 1950s through 2001. Boomlets marked 
the last part of the 1970s and, associated with the Savings and Loan Crisis, 
1988 through 1990. But in both cases the price rises, modest compared to 
what were experienced in the early twenty- Wrst century, quickly subsided.
Looking at Shiller’s entire series since 1890, it is clear that the degree 
of  real house price decline between 2006 and 2012 in the United States 
does have historical precedent. But if  we study the series closely we discover 
something else that is quite remarkable: no such decline took place during 
the interwar years. It is true, according to Shiller’s index data, that a house 
purchaser buying at the peak in 1907 and selling in the trough of  1921 
would have experienced a 40 percent decline in real value, similar to that 
experienced since 2006. And a house purchaser buying at the peak in 1894 
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21. Both 1893 and 1907 are peaks associated with Wnancial panics that ended NBER business 
cycle expansions. Indeed, the ending of the 1907 crisis beneWted from the intervention of J. P. 
Morgan (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 160), and set in motion forces that would lead to the 
creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913.
22. This series is described in Fishback and Kollmann’s Wgure 6.1 (chap. 6) as “Shiller GBW 
hybrid.” They normalize on 1930 whereas, following Shiller, I normalize on the year 2000. The 
other diVerence is that my y axis begins at the origin, which produces a less exaggerated impres-
sion of the degree of house price Xuctuations during the interwar years.
and selling at the trough in 1921 would have lost 47 percent of the value 
of the house in real terms.21 These house price losses, however, would have 
been experienced over twenty- seven- and Wfteen- year holding periods, not 
a Wve- year period. Moreover, these calculated losses are partly an artifact of 
the sharp post– World War I inXation, which home owners probably—and 
correctly—did not expect to last.
In contrast with evidence of large declines in the real price of housing 
in 2006 to 2012, what is striking for a student of the interwar period is the 
relative tameness of price movements during the 1920s and 1930s. There 
was indeed a real estate boom during the 1920s, one whose details have been 
seared into the consciousness of economic historians by the lurid descrip-
tions of it contained in J. K. Galbraith’s The Great Crash (1955). In terms of 
overall construction activity, there were, as noted, actually three consecutive 
booms, a boom in single- family residences that peaked in 1926, an apart-
ment building boom that peaked a year later, and a central business district 
building boom that extended into the early 1930s (because of semicompleted 
projects such as the Empire State Building). And, looking at residential 
prices, there was appreciation and depreciation prior to and following the 
construction peak. But the magnitudes of these price swings, compared with 
2001 to 2012, are mild.
Let’s look Wrst at nominal prices (Wgure 2.1).22 We can see house prices 
increasing from 1919 through a peak in 1925, then declining to about the 
1919 level in 1930 and then continuing to fall along with the general deXation 
in the economy before beginning to increase again in 1934.
The relative tameness of house price movements in the interwar period 
is even more apparent when we look at real price movements (Wgure 2.2). 
Comparing Wgure 2.2 with Wgure 2.1, one can see that the main eVect of 
moving to a real index is to moderate the decline evident in the early 1930s. 
As for the 1920s, after 1922, the nominal and real indexes move very closely 
with each other, because the CPI was basically stable between 1922 and 1929.
Examining the real house price series one cannot help but be struck by the 
almost complete absence of a 2001 to 2012– style price bubble and collapse. 
There is actually a slight upward trend in real housing prices, comparing the 
1930s with the 1920s, which might or might not be due to the change in the 
data source post- 1934. Of course, even if  the decline in real house prices 
between 1925 and 1932 was only 12.6 percent (as compared with a real 









Fig. 2.1 Nominal house price index, United States, 1919– 1941
Source: Shiller (2012), housing data, available at http://www .econ.yale .edu/~shiller/data .htm.











Fig. 2.2 Real house price index, United States, 1919– 1941
Source: Shiller (2012), housing data, available at http://www .econ.yale .edu/~shiller/data .htm.
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23. Fishback and Kollmann expand on this work, proceeding to develop an index of house 
prices of owner- occupied mortgaged homes. What we aspire to, however, is an index of quality- 
adjusted house prices, irrespective of whether they are owner occupied, and irrespective of 
whether they are mortgaged. Their calculated average owner occupied mortgaged (AVOOM) 
index is not necessarily a representative index of the price of the entire universe of prices, only 
those that are owner occupied and mortgaged.
in the context of mortgages with Wxed nominal interest payments had the 
potential to contribute to debt deXation and persisting problems with debt 
overhang and contagion in the 1930s. As noted in the earlier discussion of 
Mishkin, however, the lower fraction of houses mortgaged and lower loan- 
to-value ratios meant that the adverse eVect on household balance sheets 
of deXation in the face of Wxed nominal mortgage payments was modest.
As already mentioned, I argue that the diYculties construction had in 
recovering in the 1930s had more to do with the legacy of premature sub-
division (see Field 1992) than with debt overhang from real estate. This view 
is strengthened by looking at the interwar housing cycle in the light of 2001 
to 2012. Assuming house prices bottomed out in 2012:4, the 2006 to 2012 
peak- to-trough decline in real housing prices of 42 percent was more than 
triple the 1925 to 1932 decline in percentage points. And, as I will show, 
housing was much more highly leveraged in the more recent episode, which 
enabled it to pose more of a systemic threat.
2.2 Critiques of Shiller’s Series
A number of scholars, including contributors to this volume, have raised 
doubts about the reliability of Shiller’s series for the 1920s and the years 1934 
to 1940. Eugene White (2009, see also chapter 4, this volume) has argued that 
the data disguise the true magnitude of the house price boom and bust in the 
interwar period. White Wnds the series too volatile in the early years, which he 
attributes to the declining sample sizes as one goes back further in time, but 
he also suggests that the level of the series in the 1920s, and thus its interwar 
volatility, is biased downward because the series does not include the prices of 
houses bought at the peak and subsequently abandoned or foreclosed upon. 
Such houses, he argues, would not have shown up in  Grebler, Blank, and 
Winnick’s 1934 survey. He notes, however, that the size of the possible bias is 
“diYcult to assess in the absence of suYcient additional national or regional 
data” (White 2009, 9; 2014, x). Price Fishback and Trevor Kollmann (chapter 
6, this volume) note that GBW also produced a house price series adjusted 
for depreciation, and, reinforcing White’s view, suggest that Shiller’s use of 
the unadjusted series biases downward the price increases during the 1920s.
In their 2011 paper in the Review of Financial Studies, Fishback et al. 
reported data derived from the US census on the ratio of the value of owner- 
occupied housing in 1930 to the value of mortgaged owner- occupied hous-
ing in 1920 for 272 large cities in the United States (Fishback et al. 2011, 
1784).23 They found that the average ratio was 1.45, meaning that nominal 
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prices in 1930 were 45 percent higher than they had been in 1920. In contrast, 
the Grebler, Blank, and Winnick (GBW) data show nominal house prices 
lower in 1930 by about 7 percent than in 1920. The Fishback and Koll-
mann chapter in this volume (chapter 6) supersedes the comparisons made 
in the 2011 paper, although the data presented still suggest that the GBW 
data understate nominal price rises between 1920 and 1930, and overstate 
increases between 1934 and 1940.
Fishback et al. (2011) compared census data for all owner- occupied 
houses in 1930 with mortgaged occupied houses in 1920. It is diYcult to 
know if  this diVerence in the sample space between the 1920 and the 1930 
census data they rely upon introduces a bias, and if  so in which direction. 
Fishback and Kollmann’s contribution to this volume achieves consistency 
in comparing 1920 and 1930 by concentrating on data on mortgaged owner- 
occupied units, at the expense of focusing on a somewhat narrower subset of 
the residential housing stock (the GBW data are for single- family, owner- 
occupied units, irrespective of mortgage status).
An issue of particular concern in making comparisons of median house 
prices is one upon which Shiller placed a great deal of emphasis. It has to 
do with changes in the composition of the housing stock and the necessity 
of comparing the prices of similar housing units through time. Houses are 
a heterogeneous asset category. If  over time the average unit becomes larger 
or in other respects better (or the reverse), then comparisons of changes 
in median house prices may not accurately reXect what is happening with 
respect to quality- adjusted prices. Careful attempts to correct for changes 
in the composition and characteristics of housing inform the construction 
of the widely referenced indexes which in part bear his name. As the meth-
odology section for the currently produced S&P/Case- Shiller indexes states,
The indices measure changes in housing market prices given a constant 
level of quality. Changes in the types and sizes of houses or changes in 
the physical characteristics of houses are speciWcally excluded from the 
calculations to avoid incorrectly aVecting the index value.
That is one reason Shiller found the data underlying the GBW series 
appealing: the survey asked people what their house was currently worth and 
what they paid for it and when. The index was constructed based on com-
parisons of value over time for the same housing units. The modern Case- 
Shiller indexes are based on repeat sales of similar houses. In other words, 
they rely on comparisons over time of prices of individual houses that have 
sold at least twice. The index is constructed by sampling recent real estate 
transactions and then searching prior transaction records to create matched 
sales pairs for individual houses. As the document describing the methodol-
ogy states, “The main variable used for index calculation is the price change 
between two arms- length sales of the same single- family home” (Standard 
and Poor’s 2009, 6). All repeat sales pairs are candidates for inclusion, but 
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24. The reference is to a poem by Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr. The shay was so well constructed 
that it lasted 100 years before falling apart. The Case- Shiller methodology emphasizes the 
importance of controlling for changes over time in the size and physical characteristics of the 
average housing unit. The age of a unit might be considered a physical characteristic, but, again, 
the service Xow from a well- maintained house, like a shay, may not necessarily decrease with 
age. The size and physical characteristics (electriWcation, for example) of the over seven million 
units constructed in the 1920s, in relation to what was in place in 1920, and the units that were 
withdrawn from service during that decade, are in my view issues of greater empirical signiW-
cance than whether one uses the “adjusted” series constructed by GBW that factors in deprecia-
tion on the housing stock. None of the alternate series investigated by Fishback and Kollmann 
(chapter 6, this volume) changes the conclusion that house price movements, both nominal 
and real, were more moderate during the interwar period than has been true in 2001 to 2012.
non- arms- length transactions, such as those between family members, are 
excluded, as are transactions in which the property type is changed; for 
example, when a property is converted to a condominium. Statistical tech-
niques are used to reduce the weighting of outlier transactions that are not 
likely to truly be matched pairs because, for example, maintenance has been 
neglected or the house has been extensively remodeled, and to reduce the 
weight of transactions that are far separated in time.
The statistical underpinnings of the Shiller- GBW series for the years 1934 
and earlier are, to be sure, sparser and noisier than those that underlie the 
modern Case- Shiller series. The raw materials were estimated values and 
remembered sales prices observed during 1934 rather than actual transac-
tions data covering a number of years. GBW acknowledge the likelihood of 
purchase year “heaping” on years ending in 0 or 5. For each city, the price 
relatives to 1934 were calculated as the ratio of aggregated recalled purchase 
price to estimates of aggregated estimated 1934 values (the indexes might 
more closely have approximated the repeat sales methodology had they, 
for each year, averaged the price relatives for each individual housing unit). 
Despite its limitations, however, the GBW index is closer conceptually to the 
repeat sales (matched pairs) methodology than are some of the comparisons 
reported by Fishback et al. (2011) or Fishback and Kollmann (chapter 6, 
this volume).
GBW also produced a second “adjusted” series, which assumed that hous-
ing service Xow and “real” value depreciated at a compound rate of 1 and 3/8 
percent per year. Fishback and Kollmann note that GBW believed this series 
superior, and wonder why Shiller did not use it. GBW argued that houses 
deteriorated in value over time because of wear and tear and obsolescence. 
They acknowledged that structural additions and alterations worked in the 
opposite direction but cited evidence supporting their view that the former 
eVect dominated (1956, appendixes C and E). There remains, however, a 
theoretical and empirical question as to whether the service Xow from a well- 
maintained house truly declines through time. A well- maintained house, like 
a chair, may have a depreciation proWle more akin to the proverbial one- 
horse shay.24 Shiller may have been receptive to this view, and thus preferred 
the unadjusted series.
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25. For example they may have been less likely to have had hot and cold running water, had 
an interior bathroom, or been wired for electricity.
Returning to the comparisons Fishback et al. make between the 1930 and 
1920 census data, there are several reasons these might depart substantially 
from what would be yielded by matched pair reports of the same houses sold 
in 1920 and 1930. The most important is that the housing stock was diVerent 
in 1930. Over the years 1920– 1929 inclusive, over 7 million new private, 
permanent, nonfarm housing units were built (Grebler, Blank, and Win-
nick 1956, table B-1, 332). The 1930 census reported 23.2 million occupied 
nonfarm housing units. Since few of the units built in the 1920s would have 
been abandoned, unoccupied, or torn down in 1930, we can conclude that 
at least 30 percent of the units in 1930 simply were not there in 1920. More-
over, although few of the newly built units would have vanished, been torn 
down, or been unoccupied in 1930, some of the units whose prices had been 
reported in the 1920 census of mortgaged units were, by 1930, abandoned, 
torn down, or unoccupied, and they were likely to have been smaller units 
with less desirable physical characteristics.25 The 1920 census reported about 
17.6 million occupied housing units, and the 1930 census 23.2 million, an 
increase of 5.6 million. Since there were roughly 7 million units constructed, 
we can infer that about 1.4 million units fall into the category of present in 
1920 but absent in 1930.
Because the 1930 enumeration included 7 million generally higher quality 
houses not present in 1920, and because it did not include approximately 
1.4 million generally lower quality units that had been in the enumeration 
in 1920, the 1920 to 1930 comparisons reported by Fishback et al. and Fish-
back and Kollmann may give a misleading picture of quality- adjusted house 
price change between 1920 and 1930.
Fishback and Kollmann emphasize the outlier nature of the unadjusted 
GBW series, although other data are consistent with the picture it paints. 
Fisher (1951, 55, table 7), for example, looked at a sample of 3 percent of 
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) mortgage loans in the states 
of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. The underlying data included 
appraisal values for those reWnancing loans in 1933 and 1934 and purchase 
prices in 1925 and 1927. These are for the same houses, and thus the data 
approximate the repeat sales data that underlie the current Case- Shiller 
indexes, although the HOLC appraisals may have overstated the market 
value of the homes in 1933 and 1934 because of a rule limiting the loan- 
to-value ratio of the mortgage they could oVer to 80 percent. Median prices 
in Fisher’s sample decline 31 percent between 1925 and 1933 to 1934.  Grebler, 
Blank, and Winnick report approximately the same percentage decline in 
their twenty- two city sample over these years. In the Fisher sample, homes 
purchased in 1926 and 1927 had a decline of 26.9 percent nominal to 1933 to 
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26. Fishback and Kollmann (chapter 6, this volume) suggest somewhat smaller price declines 
after 1934, but still substantially larger than the Shiller numbers. As Shiller acknowledges, the 
Wve- city survey his students conducted for years after 1934 makes no claim to approximate a 
repeat sales methodology.
27. Fishback and Kollmann also augment the GBW series by adding data for thirty- one cities 
to the twenty- two originally used by GBW. But the expanded coverage does not change the 
picture much. Compare “GBW adjusted” in their Wgure 6.1 with “New GBW- Style Adjusted” 
in their Wgure 6.4. In both cases these series include the adjustment for depreciation, which 
Shiller eschewed.
1934. Using the Grebler, Blank, and Winnick series for a similar calculation 
yields a 25.2 percent decline.
Another regional series is the National Housing Agency’s compilation of 
monthly price data for Washington, DC, from 1918 through 1948, which was 
based on asking prices for houses listed for sale in newspapers. The annual 
average for 1930 is 13.5 percent higher than for 1920 (see Carter et al. 2006, 
series Dc 828), compared with Fishback et al.’s 45 percent increase and 
Grebler, Blank, and Winnick’s 7 percent decline. The Fisher numbers can be 
reconciled with the Grebler, Blank, and Winnick series, given the fact that 
the housing stock in 1930 was possibly of better quality and that these are 
not and do not approximate matched sales.
Fishback et al. (2011) also compare housing prices reported in the 1940 
census with those reported in the 1930 census, and Wnd them in nominal 
terms to be 48.6 percent lower; Shiller has them about 5 percent lower.26 
The issue of changes in the composition of the stock is less important in the 
1930s than the 1920s, since many fewer units were constructed than had been 
true in the 1920s. The number of occupied nonfarm housing units increased 
just 19 percent during the 1930s (4.4 million), as opposed to the 30 percent 
jump during the 1920s. The number of  housing starts in the years 1930 
through 1939 inclusive was even less, totaling only 2.586 million (Grebler, 
Blank, and Winnick 1956, table B-1). This means, since the number of occu-
pied units rose 4.4 million, that approximately 1.8 million units abandoned 
or unoccupied at the time of the 1930 census were now again in use. We can 
infer that these were lower quality units (after all, they had been abandoned 
during the boom time of the 1920s) and their reintroduction into the occu-
pied housing stock may be one of the reasons the Fishback et al. data show 
a sharper drop in reported values between 1934 and 1940.
All of this discussion speaks to the signiWcance of the matched sale meth-
odology pioneered and championed by Case and Shiller in developing mean-
ingful price indexes for a heterogeneous housing stock whose composition 
changes over time. Fishback et al. and Fishback and Kollmann have done 
yeoman work in digging up new data. But the alternatives they explore may 
not necessarily do a better job than the GBW series preferred by Shiller 
of reXecting changes in quality- adjusted house prices for the 1920 to 1934 
period.27
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28. See Carter et al. (2006) series Dc256 for construction and Ca213 (Balke- Gordon) for 
the gross national product (GNP), which yields a residential construction share of 5.8 percent 
for 1924, 6.0 percent for 1925, 5.7 percent for 1926, and 5.3 percent for 1927. Kendrick’s GNP 
estimates (series Ca188) are very similar. Both Balke- Gordon and Kendrick are intended con-
ceptually to be comparable to the Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates published from 
Both nominal and real prices matter in thinking about the impact of 
housing price Xuctuations on the real economy. In an institutional environ-
ment characterized by Wxed nominal debt obligations, nominal prices mat-
ter, because their decline can decrease the value of an owner’s equity. When 
both house prices and goods and service prices are declining (as was true 
between 1929 and 1933), the real burden of debt repayment can go up if  
mortgage payments are Wxed in nominal terms. But not all home owners had 
a mortgage. Indeed, the majority did not. For those who did, loan- to-value 
ratios were smaller than they are today. If we are interested in possible wealth 
eVects of  consumption caused by declines in housing equity, real prices 
matter. If  you own your house free and clear, or have a small mortgage on 
it, and it drops in value 30 percent, but so does the CPI, it should not have 
a great eVect on your behavior.
All of the decline in real house prices in the interwar period had already 
taken place by 1929, with no apparent ill eVects on the economy. Real hous-
ing prices were actually higher in 1933 than they had been in 1929. In order 
for the magnitude of the decline in real house prices in the interwar period 
to approach what has taken place since 2006, either the 1929 Wgure suggested 
by Shiller and Grebler, Blank, and Winnick would have to be 40 percent too 
low or the 1933 Wgure 40 percent too high, or there would have to be some 
combination of too low earlier and too high later yielding biases in the nomi-
nal data suYcient to disguise a 40 percent drop in the real price. We should 
accept that the real price decline in the most recent cycle has been substan-
tially greater in magnitude—the collapse has been more severe—than what 
took place during the interwar years.
2.3 Construction
There are of course at least two dimensions to a housing boom—price and 
quantity—and so one might expect from the more modest price movements 
between 1919 and 1941 that the boom and collapse of construction was also 
more moderate in the interwar period than it was in the early twenty- Wrst 
century. And one would be quite mistaken (see Wgures 2.3 and 2.4). From a 
construction standpoint the interwar boom was in fact the greatest in terms 
of the Xuctuations of construction activity, both in absolute terms and as 
a proportion of GDP, that the US economy has ever experienced. In 1924, 
1925, 1926, and 1927, residential housing construction comprised more than 
5 percent of GDP (over 6 percent in 1925), a Wgure not exceeded until the 
most recent boom.28 In the 2001 to 2005 boom, the share of  residential 
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1929 onward. Using Kuznets’s variant 1 for the denominator (series Ca184) puts residential 
construction’s share at 6.2 percent for 1924, 6.4 percent for 1925, 6.1 percent for 1926, and 
5.7 percent for 1927.
29.US Department of Commerce 2013, NIPA table 1.1.3, accessed May 30, 2013.
construction rose from 4.6 percent in 2000 to 6.2 percent in 2005 (the year 
that housing prices peaked nationally) before falling to 3.4 percent in 2008 
and 2.5 percent in 2009. By 2011:1 it had declined further to 2.2 percent, in 
2013:1 it had recovered only to 2.7 percent (US Department of Commerce 
2013, NIPA table 1.1.5, accessed May 31, 2013).
In comparison, by 1929 the housing construction share of GDP had fallen 
to 3.9 percent and by 1933 to 1 percent of  a greatly reduced GDP (US 
Department of  Commerce 2013, NIPA table 1.15). So in terms of GDP 
shares, housing construction went from 6 percent to 1 percent of  GDP 
between 1925 and 1933, and from 6.2 percent to 2.2 percent from 2005 to 
2011. If  we looked at residential construction as a fraction of  potential 
rather than actual GDP, the contrasts between these two episodes would 
be even greater.
The drop is especially dramatic in the interwar period, as Wgure 2.3 indi-
cates, if  we look at the absolute decline in inXation- adjusted residential 
construction. The years 1926 to 1933 witnessed an 89 percent decline in 
real construction activity. In comparison, assuming that the housing con-
struction cycle bottomed out in 2011, we see a peak- to-trough decline of 
57 percent in real construction activity between 2006 and 2011(see Wgure 
2.4).29 From the standpoint of construction activity, the 1920s boom and 
bust was proportionately larger. Yet the price movements associated with 
that housing cycle were more modest.
The absence of big real house price movements in the interwar period 
means that the mechanisms whereby housing contributed to recession/
depression were diVerent in the two cycles. In the 1930s, the collapse of 
construction spending and its weak recovery contributed to a slow revival 
in private sector aggregate demand primarily through standard multiplier 
mechanisms. Since the collapse of the building boom was associated with 
modest movements in the real price of housing, and the impact of the debt 
deXation mechanism was softened by the smaller fraction of houses mort-
gaged and lower loan- to-value ratios, the impact of the housing bust on 
household balance sheets was also more modest. In comparison with the 
wealth and liquidity eVects on consumption of collapsing stock prices, the 
inXuence of  the end of the housing boom on consumption expenditures 
through this mechanism was weaker, at least initially.
Between 2006 and 2011, in contrast, the collapse of the housing boom 
was associated with an approximately $7 trillion hit to household balance 
sheets (in comparison, the Xow of US GDP in 2011 was about $15 trillion 
per year). This decline in home equity was the result of  a pincer move-
ment: nominal mortgage debt continued to increase through 2007 and then 
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declined only modestly, while nominal house prices fell sharply (see Wgure 
2.6). The consequence was a big reduction in household real estate wealth. 
Given the uneven distribution of  mortgage debt this pushed millions of 
home owners underwater, in the sense that they owed more than their homes 











Fig. 2.3 Residential construction, United States, 1919– 1941
Source: Carter et al. (2006, series Dc262).
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Fig. 2.4 Index of real residential construction, United States, 2000– 2012
Source: http://www .bea .gov, NIPA table 1.1.3, accessed May 30, 2013.
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30. Since loan- to-value ratios rarely exceeded 50 percent in the 1920s, and the average nomi-
nal price decline between 1929 and 1933 appears to have been about 30 percent, simple arithme-
tic tells us that the phenomenon of underwater houses, or negative equity, with the outstanding 
loan value exceeding the house value, must have been infrequent in comparison to what has 
been the case in the post- 2005 period.
approximately 75.4 million owner- occupied US housing units, 51.4 million 
had a mortgage (US Bureau of the Census 2011, series B25087). Of these, 
more than one in four remained underwater in the Wrst quarter of  2013. 
Even though there were tens, indeed hundreds of thousands of foreclosures 
during the Depression, the phenomenon during the most recent episode has 
been more widespread and more severe in its consequences, particularly if  
we try and restrict our attention to residential housing, as opposed to the 
farm foreclosure problem. During the Depression the problem was not typi-
cally that people owed more on the house than it was worth.30 The problem 
was simply that they could not make the mortgage payments, in part because 
their nominal income had fallen, and in part because the drop in goods and 
service prices had increased the real burden of their mortgage payments.
Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005) estimate that a 10 percent decline in 
household wealth has somewhere between a .4 and a 1.1 percent eVect on 
consumption (although see Calomiris, Longhofer, and Miles 2009 for a 
more skeptical view of the size of this coeYcient). Whatever the number we 
agree on, we are dealing here with a drop in owner’s equity of more than 50 
percent, from $13.1 trillion in 2005 to $6.3 trillion in 2010. Nothing compa-
rable happened with respect to real estate wealth in the interwar period. In 
contrast, the contractionary eVect of lower construction expenditures was 
relatively more signiWcant during the interwar housing boom.
Why were the price movements and wealth eVects so much more muted 
during the interwar period than in 2001 to 2012? The most compelling 
answer is simply that residential housing was less leveraged in the 1920s than 
it became in the early twenty- Wrst century. Mortgage “innovations” such as 
option adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), no documentation loans, and 
no money down loans magniWed the upward price movements during the 
boom, as they did the downward movements in the bust. These institutional 
innovations helped upend an institutional equilibrium that, by and large, 
had kept real house prices relatively stable for half  a century.
Another way to look at this question is to ask why housing leverage was 
so low in the 1920s when, as evidenced by the stock market, the Wnancial 
system was clearly capable of Wnancing highly leveraged asset acquisition. 
Why was it that mortgage lenders in the 1920s were so stingy with down 
payment and maturity terms? Again, common terms were 50 percent down, 
Wve- year mortgages with a balloon payment at the end. It is true that innova-
tions pioneered by small building and loan societies enabled some borrowers 
to take a second mortgage and thus borrow a larger share of the house value 
(Snowden 2010). But these innovations were opposed by larger building and 
loan societies, and overall, especially in comparison with the early twenty- 
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31. Whether the same can be said for loans on commercial and central business district 
structures remains an open question. See Postel- Vinay (2011) for evidence on the role bad real 
estate loans played in failures of Chicago- area state banks.
32. White also emphasizes the typical absence of deposit insurance (state schemes generally 
covered smaller banks in more rural or agricultural areas) as well as the imposition in some 
states of  double liability on shareholders of  failed banks, both of which, it can be argued, 
increased the incentives of depositors or shareholders to monitor the liability side of Wnancial 
institutions of which they were creditors.
Wrst century, the overall picture is one of conservatism (White [2009], 26 
reaches a similar conclusion).
One might argue, and indeed it was argued in the 1930s that the typical 
loan contract from the 1920s was in fact risky to lenders (Morton 1956). It 
was the heavy and perhaps unanticipated costs of foreclosure that made it 
so (see Ghent 2010, 11). Given the experience with the foreclosure process 
that had by then manifested itself, one can perhaps understand the argument 
from an ex post standpoint. But if  foreclosure had been costless, requiring a 
50 percent down payment surely would have given considerable protection 
to the lender, who always, of course, had the option of rolling the balloon 
loan over. It is hard to see how, absent the large transactions costs associated 
with foreclosure, an 80 percent, thirty- year loan, even one fully amortized, 
was, on the face of it, less risky for the lender than a 50 percent, Wve- year, 
nonamortized loan.
There was in fact a large percentage increase in mortgage lending in the 
Wrst half  of the 1920s. But that increase was from a modest base, and consid-
ering loan- to-value ratios and other metrics, it is fair to say that lending on 
residential real estate, in comparison to what transpired in the early twenty- 
Wrst century, remained conservative.31
This conservatism was in part because legislation governing lending by 
national banks mandated higher down payments. And even though state- 
chartered commercial banks and building and loans were not so constrained, 
the prior history of land and real estate speculation, in which lending stan-
dards had been at times lax, leading to sometimes extreme cycles of boom 
and bust in house prices prior to the 1920s, which lay behind the National 
Banking Act restrictions, acted as something of a deterrent on lending by 
institutions that were not constrained.
White (2009) has argued that conservatism in the 1920s was reinforced by 
the absence of a “too big to fail” expectation,32 although it is not clear that 
the major players in the residential mortgage market (building and loans, 
mutual savings banks, insurance companies) could have had this expectation 
even had the government or Fed announced a willingness to rescue systemi-
cally important institutions. For a Wnancial institution to be systemically 
important it must have liabilities serving as assets for other institutions, 
so that if  it fails its creditor Wnancial institutions are threatened as well, or 
like a commercial bank, have demand deposits as liabilities, so that collapse 
reduces the means of payment (money supply).
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To be sure, by the last years of the 1920s, there was plenty of excess in 
real estate lending. Declines in lending standards (see Saulnier 1956), self- 
dealing, fraud, all of this was evident in absolute terms. But not in comparison 
with what took place between 2001 and 2008. Decades of experience of real 
estate cycles in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had persuaded 
lenders—and legislators—that real estate was a very risky asset, by no 
means certain or even expected to appreciate, and one for which lenders 
should take moderate and short- lived stakes, and ensure that borrowers had 
plenty of skin in the game.
An implication of this is that although the failure of housing construc-
tion to revive during the 1930s helps explain the duration of the Depression, 
balance sheet aspects of housing sector Wnance are today more important 
in obstructing recovery than was true in the Great Depression. As has been 
noted, there are several distinct mechanisms whereby housing can aVect a 
downturn. A decline in construction can, ampliWed by multiplier eVects, 
lead directly to a decline in equilibrium output, associated with drops in 
both consumption and gross private domestic investment. In the 1920s the 
decline in residential construction was, from an aggregate demand perspec-
tive, compensated for by the apartment building boom followed by central 
business district (CBD) construction, which extended into the 1930s. Strong 
exports helped as well. But when construction went south big time in the 
1930s, this mechanism became very important in accounting for the pro-
longed downturn and the failure to recover.
A second depression- inducing, housing- related mechanism involves bor-
rowers on real estate who cannot service their mortgages, become delinquent, 
and eventually face foreclosure. As they struggle to meet their mortgage 
obligations, nonhousing consumption is adversely impacted. Foreclosures 
were an important feature of the early 1930s (see Wheelock 2008), but they 
were not primarily produced by the cessation of increases and then actual 
declines in house prices, which was the main driver after 2006. Rather, during 
the early years of the 1930s, it was declines in income (among those unem-
ployed, for example), that predisposed to foreclosure. Of course as deXation 
set in during the early 1930s, the real value of debt service obligations Wxed in 
nominal terms did increase, aggravating the pressure on borrowers in diYcult 
positions. Because of lower leverage, however, shorter average durations of 
mortgages, and a smaller fraction of the housing stock encumbered by loans, 
bad mortgage debt from housing did not play as signiWcant a role in transmit-
ting a Wnancial shock to lending institutions as was the case in 2007 to 2009.
2.4 Foreclosures
There was indeed a serious foreclosure problem during the Great Depres-
sion, but it was more speciWcally a farm foreclosure problem. Two decades 
of farm prosperity came to an end at the conclusion of World War I, and 
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33. The data on Wlings include notices of default, scheduled auctions, and real estate owned 
(REO) property.
farm incomes and land values declined steadily during the 1920s, a major 
factor in bank failures during that decade (Alston, Grove, and Wheelock 
1994; Field 1992, 2001). The precipitous decline in agricultural commodity 
prices between 1929 and 1933 made a fragile situation worse, and attempts 
to foreclose led to actual or threatened violence and multiple state- level 
foreclosure moratoria.
Foreclosures on residential housing during the 1930s, although a very real 
and painful phenomenon, were, however, proportionately less common than 
has been true in the years since 2006. To show this, we begin with interwar 
data for nonfarm housing units, over three- fourths of the occupied hous-
ing units in 1930, for which the statistical information is less ambiguous. 
The number of foreclosures for nonfarm occupied housing units, 68,100 in 
1926, rose to 134,900 by 1929, and peaked in 1933 at 252,400, before gradu-
ally subsiding to 58,559 by 1941 (Carter et al. 2006, series Dc1255). The 
1930 census reported 23,235,982 occupied nonfarm housing units (Carter 
et al. 2006, series Dc697-698). Using the 1930 occupied housing number 
as a denominator, and the peak 1933 foreclosure number as numerator, we 
can conclude that 1.08 percent of the nonfarm occupied housing stock was 
foreclosed upon in the worst year of the Depression. This number is prob-
ably biased slightly upward because we have not attempted to correct for the 
possible growth in occupied housing units between 1930 and 1933.
In contrast, RealtyTrac (2011) reported that in 2010, 2,871,891 housing 
units in the United States experienced a foreclosure Wling.33 This represented 
2.23 percent of all US housing units; the total of about 130 million in 2010 
includes seasonal units as well as occupied all year units and those that were 
vacant. Note that the 1933 calculation has occupied units in the denomina-
tor. If  that calculation were comparable to that made for 2010, the denomi-
nator would include vacant and seasonal units as well, and the foreclosure 
rate would be lower.
The fact that more than twice the proportion of all housing units were 
foreclosed upon in 2010 as compared with the proportion of nonfarm units 
foreclosed upon in 1933 is indicative of the higher fraction of the housing 
stock encumbered by a mortgage, the substantially higher degree of leverage, 
and the much greater decline in nominal and real housing prices that have 
marked the more recent cycle.
The data for the 1930s in the aforementioned calculations are, of course, 
for the nonfarm housing sector. Adding in data on farm- occupied housing 
units will increase our estimate of the rate for all occupied units. The 1930 
census shows that there were about a third as many occupied farm housing 
units (6,668,881) as there were nonfarm units (there were 29,904,663 total 
units, so farm housing units were about a quarter of the total). The rate 
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of foreclosure on farm housing would have had to have been substantially 
higher than on nonfarm housing to yield a foreclosure rate on the entire 
occupied housing stock approaching that experienced in 2010. I calculate 
that 424,473 farm housing foreclosures—6.2 percent—or one of every six-
teen farm housing units would have had to have been foreclosed upon in 
1933 in order to make the overall foreclosure rate on residential housing 
equal to what it was in 2010.
The rate of foreclosure on farm housing is inextricably entangled with the 
rate of foreclosures on farms, and these are not exactly the same. They are, 
nevertheless, closely related, and we do have some data on the latter. Alston 
(1983, 886) reports that in 1933, the worst year of  the Depression, over 
200,000 farms were foreclosed—3.88 percent of all farm units. This is sig-
niWcantly below the 6.2 percent rate that would have been needed to equate 
the overall 1933 foreclosure rate to that experienced in 2010. Since a number 
of states passed laws instituting moratoria on farm foreclosures, it is pos-
sible that in their absence, we would have had foreclosure rates at that level.
Citing Federal Reserve Board data, Alston, Grove, and Wheelock (1994, 
415) indicate that 42 percent of  owner- occupied farms had a mortgage 
in 1930. Parker (2005, 57), reviewing early research by Galbraith, reports 
that half  of all farm mortgages were in default by 1933. This suggests that 
approximately a Wfth of owner- occupied farms were potentially vulnerable 
to foreclosure during the worst year of the Depression. In comparing fore-
closure rates on residential housing in the early twenty- Wrst century with 
those in the 1930s, a diYculty thus arises: how should we treat a foreclosure 
or potential foreclosure on a farm property that also includes a residential 
housing unit? Since roughly a quarter of all residential housing units were 
on farms the issue can be neither dismissed nor easily resolved.
Some conclusions can, however, be stated without qualiWcation. If  we 
restrict our attention to nonfarm residential housing units, or to actual 
foreclosures on all residential units (considering a foreclosure on a farm as 
equivalent to a foreclosure on a farm housing unit) the foreclosure rates in 
2010 were unambiguously higher than those during the worst year of the 
Depression. These higher foreclosure rates were, moreover, generated in an 
environment in which the unemployment rate did not break 10 percent (as 
opposed to 25 percent in 1933), which gives us additional appreciation for 
how fragile the housing Wnance situation had become by 2006.
In the 1930s, and under the aegis of the Federal Housing Authority, insti-
tutional changes ushered in an era of higher leverage in housing than had 
prevailed in the 1920s. These changes were associated with a one- time per-
manent upward movement in real housing prices in the years immediately 
after the war. In part because of organizational and procedural controls 
on the quality of  lending, however, this rise was sustained, leading to a 
half  century of relative stability in real housing prices, from the early 1950s 
through 2001. Prior to the twenty- Wrst century, this was disrupted at the 
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national level only by boomlets in the late 1970s and again during the sav-
ings and loan (S&L)– fueled 1988 to 1990 period, but each of these subsided 
relatively quickly.
Beginning in the 1980s under President Reagan, gathering steam under 
President Clinton in the 1990s, and continuing under President George W. 
Bush at the turn of  the twenty- Wrst century, Wnancial deregulation and 
changes in the Wnancial services industry destroyed the previous institutional 
equilibrium. Out of  this witches’ brew (much more than simply the low 
interest rates of the early twenty- Wrst century, on which it is often blamed), 
emerged the housing boom and the near catastrophic Wnancial meltdown 
that followed.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate the very diVerent degrees of housing leverage 
in the interwar cycle as compared with 2001 to 2012. Figure 2.5 shows the 
nominal value of the net housing stock along with the nominal value of 
residential mortgage debt from 1926 through 1941. The debt- to-asset ratio 
never rose above 25 percent during these years (see Wgure 2.7), starting at 
10.9 percent in 1925, ending at 12.5 percent in 1941, and peaking in 1932 
at 22.6 percent under the inXuence of temporarily declining nominal house 



















Nominal Value of Net Housing Stock Mortgage Debt (Nominal)
Fig. 2.5 Nominal housing value and mortgage debt, United States, 1925– 1941
Sources: Nominal value of net housing stock, US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (2011, Wxed asset table 1.1, http://www .bea .gov, accessed June 6, 2011); nomi-
nal value of mortgage debt on residential structures, Carter et al. (2006, sum of series 
Dc916-922).
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in 1932 home owners were stressed. But the degree of leverage is dwarfed 
by what transpired in the Wrst decade of the twenty- Wrst century. The debt- 
to-asset ratio averaged roughly 40 percent during the run up to the housing 
price explosion, and then jumped to over 60 percent starting in 2006 in the 
face of rapidly declining house prices and a nominal debt burden that con-
tinued to increase through 2007 and then fell oV only slightly. It remained 
at that level through 2011.
The comparative trends in housing debt- to-asset ratios, comparing 1925 
to 1941 with 1996 to 2012, are illustrated in Wgure 2.7.
2.5 Conclusion
Using a comparative historical approach, this chapter has identiWed 
several important diVerences in the housing sector’s characteristics and con-
tributions to macroeconomic instability in the interwar period as compared 
with 2001 to 2012. First, in terms of Xuctuations in residential construction 
activity, and whether measured in absolute terms or as a share of GDP, the 
















Nominal Value of Housing Stock Nominal Value of Mortgage Debt
Fig. 2.6 Nominal value of housing stock and mortgage debt, United States,  
1995– 2012
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (2011, Wxed asset table 
1.1, http://www .bea .gov); Carter et al. (2006, series Dc916-922); http://www .federalreserve 
 .gov, Flow of Funds accounts, table B-100, lines 4 and 33, accessed May 30, 2012.
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severe in terms of Xuctuations in the real price of housing and their impact 
on household and banking institution balance sheets. Finally, housing was 
much less levered in the 1920s than was true in the run up to the most recent 
crisis.
The chapter argues that the second and third of  these diVerences are 
related. During the 1920s, a prior historical experience of housing booms 
and busts had disciplined lenders to treat housing as a very risky asset, and 
made them at least initially unwilling to lend liberally on it, with the standard 
for “liberalism” being what transpired between 2001 and 2008. Although 
these inhibitions, which had been reinforced by legislation and government 
regulation, weakened as the decade of the 1920s proceeded, the overall out-
come was still a housing sector that was much less leveraged than in 2001 to 
2012. In contrast, between 2001 and 2006 institutional restraints on lending 
that had for the most part obtained for half  a century broke down under the 
banner of deregulation, innovative ways to Wnance housing, and shoddy and 
sometimes fraudulent work by mortgage appraisers, originators, securitiz-
ers, and ratings agencies.
The channels through which a housing bust aVected the rest of  the 
economy were diVerent across these two periods. The impact of  the col-
lapse in construction spending in the 1930s was felt particularly strongly 
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Fig. 2.7 Debt- to-asset ratios in housing, United States, 1925– 1941 and 1996– 2012
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (2011, Wxed asset table 
1.1, http://www .bea .gov); Carter et al. (2006, series Dc916-922); http://www .federalreserve .
gov, Flow of Funds accounts, table B-100, lines 4 and 33.
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multiplier mechanisms, indirectly on consumption. In the housing bust of 
the early twenty- Wrst century, this mechanism was weaker. On the other 
hand, the relative stability of housing values in the interwar period meant 
that the eVect of the end of the boom on household consumption through 
a direct wealth eVect was weaker, certainly in comparison to the eVect of 
the collapse of stock prices.
In contrast, in 2001 to 2012, with an almost $7 trillion drop in house 
values, this eVect was stronger. And because of the much higher degree of 
leverage in 2001 to 2012, the problems of debt overhang and underwater 
home owners were more severe than was true in the interwar period. More-
over, because of the interconnections between high leverage in households 
and highly leveraged and interconnected Wnancial institutions, the ability 
of  a prior real estate lending boom to pose a systemic threat to United 
States and world Wnancial institutions was higher in the Wrst decade of the 
twenty- Wrst century than was true in the interwar period. The mechanisms 
and interconnections that allowed this to happen in the early twenty- Wrst 
century are documented in the Wnal report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission (2011).
Compared to what happened in the 1920s, postwar subdivisions were 
more eYciently designed for an automobile age, and, because of the integra-
tion of the subdivider/developer function there was much less of a postboom 
problem of subdivisions with a few houses built here and there. Subdivisions 
in the postwar period tended to be opened in sections, with a new one not 
opening until the previous one had been built out. This was not true in the 
1920s. As bad as things may have been after the savings and loan bubble or 
the most recent upswing, they were worse in this respect during the interwar 
period. That is, the physical legacy of premature and partially completed 
subdivisions in the 1920s posed a greater hindrance to the recovery of con-
struction in the 1930s than has been true in postwar cycles. True, some over-
built subdivisions from 2001 to 2010 left vacant and allowed to deteriorate, 
may ultimately have to be bulldozed; this was true as well after the S&L 
insolvencies. But the physical legacies of postwar housing booms, including 
the most recent one, pose less of an obstacle to long- term recovery than was 
true during the interwar period.
On the other hand, the Wnancial legacies pose a more serious threat to 
economy- wide recovery today than was true during the Depression. That 
is because housing was much less leveraged in the 1920s than was true in 
the early twenty- Wrst century. In the more recent episode, more houses had 
mortgages, loan- to-value ratios were much higher on average, and securi-
tization has meant that there were many more avenues for contagion from 
household to Wnancial institution balance sheets.
When New Deal reformers set their minds to mitigating the likelihood of 
a recurrence of the Great Depression, they addressed housing, but placed 
much more emphasis on the travails of the stock market. They insisted on 
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34. Investment banking proWts, among other sources, derive from commissions earned mar-
keting new bond and stock issues to retail customers, advice provided to potential merger 
candidates, and income from trading on the bank’s own account (proprietary trading). There 
is abundant evidence that proprietary trading by depository institutions was implicated in the 
2008 Wnancial crisis, and some evidence that its frequency, and the share of proWts from this 
source, increased prior to the crisis (see “Obama to Propose Limits on Risks Taken by Banks,” 
by Jackie Calmes and Louis Uchitelle, New York Times, January 20, 2010; Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission 2011). The “Volker rule” was intended to prohibit proprietary trading 
by commercial banks.
35. As Eichengreen and Mitchener observed, “the Great Crash bequeathed a legacy of 
problems for banks, corporations and households, which had assumed heavy debt loads and 
packed their portfolios full of now poorly performing assets” (2004, 190).
separating commercial and investment banking.34 During the 1920s hous-
ing boom, commercial banking had been involved to only a limited degree 
in housing Wnance, and although investment banking activities did include 
placements of  some mortgage- backed securities, these tended to be for 
the purposes of Wnancing commercial and other nonresidential structures 
(Goetzmann and Newman 2010). The insistence on separating commercial 
from investment banking (Glass- Steagall) was motivated by what were per-
ceived as improper or imprudent commercial bank lending on stocks, not 
real estate. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934 mandated new transparency in security issues and corporate report-
ing in the hopes of mitigating the magnitude and impacts of subsequent 
booms and busts in the market for equities.
New Deal legislation, including acts establishing the Home Owners’ Loan 
Corporation (1933), the Federal Housing Administration (1934), and the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (1938) did address issues in the 
housing sector. While these organizations aimed at alleviating Depression 
era problems, their mandates do not suggest that housing and its Wnancing 
per se was perceived as a locus of the origins of the economic downturn. 
The HOLC engaged in remedial intervention, and indeed stopped making 
new loans after 1935. The FHA pioneered in establishing the viability of the 
thirty- year, Wxed- term, fully amortized mortgage, and promulgating better 
designs for residential subdivisions, and the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, chartered in 1938, established a secondary market for home 
mortgages. These changes helped usher in a half  century of relative stability 
in real house prices.
But these changes in the institutional mechanisms of residential Wnance 
were not primarily oriented toward mitigating a systemic risk that lending 
on real estate was perceived as having generated during the 1920s. Remedial 
eVorts to mitigate such risk concentrated much more on the stock market, 
focusing on the purchase, sale, and Wnancing of equities, with the twin objec-
tives of increasing transparency and limiting leverage. Unlike real estate, 
which declined in nominal terms by 30 percent but in real terms hardly at 
all, the 89 percent nominal (60 percent real) decline in the Dow Jones index 
reXected a drop in the value of the highly levered stock market that had more 
severe consequences.35 Indeed, while the Securities and Exchange Act of 
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1934 was tightening margin requirements on stock purchases, amendments 
to the Federal Reserve Act in 1935 loosened margin requirements in terms of 
the ability of federally chartered national banks to lend on real estate. And 
while those amendments relaxed constraints on lending by banks on real 
estate, perhaps the most famous legislation of the New Deal era, the Glass- 
Steagall Act (1933– 1999), drastically restricted the ability of commercial 
banks or their aYliates to take positions in equities. This emphasis on the 
market for stocks rather than real estate as ground zero for the unfolding 
Great Depression stands in sharp contrast to the diagnoses of the locus of 
the onset of the 2008 and 2009 Wnancial crisis and ensuing economic reces-
sion and slow recovery. The diVerential legislative attention during the New 
Deal is consistent with the narrative developed in this chapter.
There is broad consensus that the 2007 to 2012 Wnancial crisis and after-
math originated in US housing markets, precipitated by imprudent real 
estate loans, enabled by lax regulation and associated behavior by ratings 
agencies, and facilitated by innovations in mortgage products and deriva-
tives, particularly credit default swaps and tranched mortgage- backed secu-
rities. There is as well much evidence that, for both the interwar period and 
the early twenty- Wrst century, the quantity and quality of credit extended 
during the boom created obstacles to recovery that prolonged depression/
recession.
But history never repeats itself  exactly. Although no doubt contributory, 
bad residential housing lending in the interwar period did not play as central 
a role in blocking recovery as it does today. The legacies of the explosion of 
mortgage debt between 2001 and 2007 and the 42 percent drop in real house 
prices between 2006 and 2012 included impaired household balance sheets, 
eVectively insolvent Wnancial institutions, and extensive, lengthy, and drawn 
out foreclosure processes. These legacies exercised a persistent retardative 
eVect on the macroeconomy, the result of which will be a cumulative output 
loss substantially exceeding that associated with the 1982 recession, which 
had heretofore been the worst since the Great Depression.
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